Five years into The
Black Swan: Second Edition: The Impact of the Highly Improbable: With a new
section: "On Robustness and Fragility."
Seldom have I been more impressed with the subtle accuracy of a
generalization than in the case of Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s dictum, “you never win an argument
until they attack your person.” As an essayist and statistician, this
Lebanese American teaching currently at NYU Polytechnic has developed some of
the most original critical thinking on risk analysis and risk engineering. It
reaches far beyond mathematical finance and has game-changing consequences for
decision-making overall. Not many quants have their writings called to be among
the dozen
most influential books since WWII. No stranger to controversy, Taleb made
his assertion first in 2007 that statistics is inherently incomplete as a tool
set because it cannot predict the risk of rare events (which he calls Black
Swans). But despite their rarity, and despite being incapable of prediction by
extrapolation of existing data, they have disproportionally vast effects.
Since I can remember, I have heard people acknowledge, with a snicker,
the ‘theoretical’ possibility of systemic risk, of a meltdown of basic
operating infrastructure and assumptions. Like the presumption of innocence, it
had become one of those exercises in lip service everyone made a ritual of
mentioning while appealing to a near-universal consensus (end-time theorists of
all stripes excepted) that systemic risk was just a theoretical hypothesis.
Prior to 2008, who except few eye witnesses of 1929 et seq. would have given
serious consideration to “major banks not lending to their peers,” bringing the
money market to a virtual standstill? Who would have expected that banks would,
in essence, depart the lending business altogether – at least to the extent it
could not be pushed off their balance sheet? Or that there would not be
significant demand for major-ticket securities blessed by all three major
rating agencies with their highest medals of honor? Or have perceived the Swiss
National Bank as a source of global instability?
If we are to capture by intellect and to deal meaningfully with the
effects of entirely random and unpredictable events in life, we require
different tools than conventional wisdom traditionally uses – and that includes
transcending conventional statistics.
I don’t consider most book reviews highly useful because they are
typically read in lieu of the book.
So I will not write one in this case because Taleb’s writing is not
particularly fraught with ballast, deserves to be read cover-to-cover, and is capable
of some
degree of visualization.
His analysis of “our
blindness with respect to randomness, particularly large deviations” is sharp
and very different from conventional academic thinking about risk, not readily
reviewable but hugely consequential. Its value lay in permeating and uprooting one’s
entire thinking about how to deal with risk – in legal and financial
engineering, but also in terms of mature and fully rational methods of
decision-making that take into account ‘highly improbable’ yet not all that
infrequent events. For, overall, they may be that, but if we look at their
impact, they are anything but rare or ephemeral. And Taleb’s theory is capable of scaling and expansion
– there are a lot more gray than black swans, that is, unlikely events capable
of anticipation whose nature and extent of risk and damage nonetheless pose
extraordinary difficulties for any predictive calculation. Yet the survival of
the enterprise or its operating environment at large requires nothing less. Swan
Lake contains a lot more than just fifty shades of gray birds.
Excesses of the author’s colorful personality and style entirely and
consciously aside, my mathematical as well as legal world-view stands to be
influenced by Taleb’s brilliant and mind-altering writing, as a growing number
of readers empirically skeptical of experts and critical of commonly accepted
standards of knowledge, cognition and behavior seems to concur. Taleb says we
focus too much on what we know and by far too little on the vast universe of
what we do not know. Having studied a range of phenomena of ignorance since
2011, I find no surprise in the fact that it has spawned further research that
heralds not just “the end of probability” but also looks
past representational knowledge altogether and seeks to operate with
“blank” swans, critical of the entire framework of thought underlying
probability theory.
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